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Applied Epistemology and Understanding in Information Studies 
Tim Gorichanaz 
Abstract 
Introduction. Applied epistemology allows information studies to benefit from 
developments in philosophy. In information studies, epistemic concepts are rarely 
considered in detail. This paper oﬀers a review of several epistemic concepts, focusing 
on understanding, as a call for further work in applied epistemology in information 
studies.  
Method. A hermeneutic literature review was conducted on epistemic concepts in 
information studies and philosophy. Relevant research was retrieved and reviewed 
iteratively as the research area was refined. 
Analysis. A conceptual analysis was conducted to determine the nature and 
relationships of the concepts surveyed, with an eye toward synthesizing 
conceptualizations of understanding and opening future research directions.  
Results. The epistemic aim of understanding is emerging as a key research frontier 
for information studies. Two modes of understanding (hermeneutic and 
epistemological) were brought into a common framework. 
Conclusions. Research on understanding in information studies will further 
naturalistic information research and provide coherence to several strands of 
philosophic thought.  
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What is information studies for? Presumably, the products and processes that result 
from information research are intended for some purpose. Information involves 
intellectual activity, and so it would seem that information products and processes 
contribute to some epistemic aims (i.e., goals related to knowing), among other 
possible aims. These aims are generally left implicit; explicating them, however, can 
clarify the contribution of a given study, product or service. It seems that information 
studies has long assumed knowledge as its default epistemic aim; understanding has 
emerged as an intriguing alternative in recent years, necessitating reconsideration of 
epistemic frameworks.  
 This paper seeks to synthesize the literature in philosophy and information 
studies on the concept of understanding so that it can be applied to further research 
and practice in information studies. In particular, it brings together discussions of 
understanding in hermeneutic phenomenology with those in epistemology under a 
common framework. In order to characterize understanding, other epistemic 
concepts are discussed. This work should be considered by information professionals 
and researchers on the way to articulating the purposes of their activities. What 
emerges from this synthesis is an account of the value of understanding to extend 
current theory and practice in information studies. As such, this paper serves to 
foment further understanding-related work in information studies.  
 The inherently epistemic nature of some aspects of information studies 
suggests some synergy with applied epistemology. This is not to equate the two or 
collapse one into the other; it is merely to suggest that something can be gained from 
considering applied epistemology for its relevance to information studies. As such, 
though this paper invokes literature of a philosophical bent from within and outside 
of information studies, it seeks to draw lessons for information researchers and 
professionals of all kinds. That is to say, philosophy can be useful.  
 This paper begins with a historical discussion of epistemological reflection in 
information studies, including both epistemology and applied epistemology. Next, it 
develops an account of the concept of understanding to be useful for applied 
epistemology in information studies. Understanding begs the consideration of other 
epistemic concepts; thus, data, information, meaning, knowledge and wisdom are 
also briefly discussed. These discussions are not exhaustive but rather suggestive, such 
that interested readers can refer to the more exhaustive reviews that are cited. This 
 2
paper closes with a discussion of how the epistemology of understanding can be 
applied to ongoing issues in information studies. 
Background 
 Epistemology in Information Studies 
 In the mid-20th century, Egan and Shera (1952) considered information 
studies to be under-theorized, an observation that had been reverberating for at least 
two decades (cf. Butler, 1933). To establish a guiding theory for information studies, 
they developed the concept of social epistemology, which they defined as 'the study of 
those processes by which society as a whole seeks to achieve a perceptive or understanding 
relation to the total environment' (Egan and Shera, 1952, p. 132, emphasis theirs). 
Within the framework of social epistemology, the work of information professionals 
is the facilitation of the acquisition and development of knowledge (Egan and Shera, 
1952). 
Fallis (2006) and Furner (2010), in their review articles on philosophy in 
information studies, consider Egan and Shera's (1952) contribution to be the first 
linkage of information studies to epistemology, and a well-placed one. Fallis (2006) 
argues that, of all the branches of philosophy, epistemology is the most relevant to 
information studies on the basis that 'helping people to acquire knowledge is the main 
objective of libraries and other information services' (Fallis, 2006, p. 508, emphasis his). 
Similarly, Dick (2013) contends that epistemological reflection is vital for 
information studies because of the sheer diversity of intellectual and theoretical issues 
that information studies seeks to integrate. Yu (2015) agrees, also noting that ethics 
oﬀers additional important grounding for the information studies mission. 
Van der Veer Martens (2015) argues that what is called social epistemology 
today—i.e., the work developed by Fuller (1988) and published in Social 
Epistemology, the journal he founded—is diﬀerent from what Egan and Shera (1952) 
conceptualized. Whereas Egan and Shera sought a focus on the formalization (i.e., 
externalization) and transfer of knowledge, modern social epistemology focuses on 
the sociology of knowledge (social construction of knowledge) and the epistemology 
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of social knowledge (social dimensions of knowledge). According to Van der Veer 
Martens, the concerns of information studies are diﬀerent—for example, it must 
account for both factual and fictional works. As such, Van der Veer Martens proposes 
that the philosophy of information, developed by Floridi, is the spiritual successor of 
Egan and Shera's philosophical vision and an appropriate philosophical system to 
ground information studies. Scholars within information studies have agreed and 
disagreed with this (see Van der Veer Martens, 2015), but most agree that the full 
implications of the philosophy of information for information studies have not yet 
been explored (Bawden and Robinson, 2012; Hjørland, 2014). It should be noted 
that Floridi's work is not without its critics; for critical views, see Capurro (2008) and 
Searle (2014; Searle & Floridi, 2014). 
This paper will not engage directly in these debates, but it will be open to the 
work of Floridi as a way to deepen the conceptualization of the epistemic concepts 
under consideration.  
 Applied Epistemology and Information Studies 
 Concurrently, in recent decades, eﬀorts have been made to apply philosophy 
to outside fields of research and practice (Battersby, 1989; Coady and Fricker, 2017; 
Klausen, 2009). Applied philosophy involves discussing the relevance of 
philosophical issues to other areas of inquiry. Applied ethics has been recognized for 
several decades, primarily in jurisprudence, but other forms of applied philosophy are 
emerging. For instance, the journal Applied Ontology was founded in 2005 as a forum 
for bringing the philosophical work in ontology (the study of beings and being, often 
in terms of classification) to bear on technological and conceptual issues related to 
information content organization, the semantic web, etc. (Lenat, 2005).  
More recently, applied epistemology has begun to be recognized. Applied 
epistemology seeks to better disclose the extent to which enterprises such as scientific 
publishing, information systems, etc., truly contribute to epistemic aims, and it may 
also sharpen insights around how apparently non-epistemic issues impinge on 
knowing and knowledge. To date, applied epistemology has been called upon mostly 
in legal discourse, but there is ample opportunity to apply philosophical 
epistemology to other fields (Coady and Fricker, 2017).  
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Information studies has a long history of discussing the trustworthiness and 
informativeness of information sources and documents, particularly in information 
literacy, which is also bound up with discussions of relevance (for a review, see 
Saracevic, 2007). There seems to be clear synergy between applied epistemology and 
information studies; however, this does not seem to have been widely recognized.  
Within information studies, seemingly the only study operationalizing 
applied epistemology comes from Fallis and Whitcomb (2009), who oﬀer a concrete 
method for applying epistemology to information studies practice in the context of 
decision making. They describe how epistemic values (e.g., error avoidance, cost 
minimization, viewpoint diversity, timeliness) can be linked and weighted to guide 
decisions in information management. Fallis and Whitcomb argue that, for these 
hierarchies to be improved, information scientists need more detailed analyses of 
epistemic values and aims. And though epistemology is generally defined as the study 
of knowledge, they recognize that other epistemic aims may be possible beyond 
merely knowledge. (A careful reader will note that Egan and Shera's original 1952 
formulation of social epistemology references, for instance, understanding.) Fallis and 
Whitcomb also suggest that applied epistemology could be implemented in 
information studies beyond decision analysis.  
To this end, the following section seeks to clarify the concept of 
understanding as one of these epistemic concepts besides knowledge. 
Conceptualizations of understanding tend to hinge on other epistemic concepts; 
thus, to clarify understanding it is necessary to briefly survey a number of other 
concepts. Following that will be a discussion of how the epistemology of 
understanding can be applied to ongoing issues in information studies. 
Epistemic Concepts in Information Studies 
Ackoﬀ (1989) presented an epistemic pyramid of information-related concepts with 
the following levels: data, information, knowledge, understanding and wisdom. In 
this model, data is processed to become information, which is then processed to 
become knowledge, and so on, in a linear fashion. As Ma (2012) observes, Ackoﬀ 
describes these processes in terms of an engineering system despite his initial 
description of the levels in the hierarchy as contents of the human mind. For this and 
other reasons, the model has been much discussed and criticized (Frické, 2009; Ma, 
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2012; Rowley, 2007; Zins, 2007). Still, the concepts Ackoﬀ identified are of 
enduring interest to information studies (Bawden and Robinson, 2012); and many 
have emerged in philosophical accounts, such as Floridi's (2011) philosophy of 
information. Floridi's work is notable in that it presents a fresh attempt to reconcile 
human and computing notions of information, the prospect of which has been of 
ongoing debate (see Furner, 2010). 
Bawden and Robinson (2016a, 2016b) have pointed out that Ackoﬀ's 
mention of understanding has fallen out of subsequent commentary about epistemic 
concepts in information science (see also Rowley, 2007). They argue that 
understanding may have a lot to oﬀer information science, which will be discussed in 
further detail below. This section seeks to bring together the broad literature on 
understanding in order to move these discussions forward. In order to do so, it is 
necessary to first briefly oﬀer an account of other epistemic concepts.  
This section presents a broad literature review of the key epistemic concepts 
in information studies. The literature review unfolded in the manner of a 
hermeneutic circle, as described by Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic (2010). As they 
contend, research in information studies begins with an open-ended question (rather 
than a constrained, once-and-final question) and the question is constantly 
reinterpreted as literature is retrieved, read and traced. Here, an ‘increased 
understanding of the research area and better understanding of the research problem 
inform each other’ (Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2010, p. 130). Such a literature 
review iterates in cycles of: searching for literature; sorting and selecting results; 
selecting, acquiring and reading documents; identifying further literature and search 
terms; refining the questions; and then searching again. While this mode of 
engagement with the literature can lead to a deep understanding of the field, it is not 
systematic in the traditional sense.  
In the present study, the literature review began as an open-ended foray into 
the epistemological discussions of information studies, narrowing in on particular 
concepts, leading to the identification of understanding as a concept of particular 
import, a process that went took place over a period of two years. The goal of this 
review was not to present an exhaustive account of a pre-determined set of questions, 
but rather to come to grips with the complexity and uncertainty involved in the 
kaleidoscopic conceptualizations of epistemological concepts in information studies 
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in eﬀort to point to key opportunities for further development and application. In 
the course of reviewing the literature, these concepts were analysed with an eye 
toward developing a framework of understanding.   
 Data 
 Many accounts of epistemic concepts in information studies take data to be 
the most fundamental concept, on which other concepts rely (Yu, 2015; Zins, 2007). 
The concept of data itself has been little explored, as it is usually only discussed as an 
approach to information. To that end, Furner (2016) oﬀers a historical conceptual 
review of data. The primary connotation of data in the modern day seems to be 
related to computing. However, the word has had many connotations in its long 
history: as a gift (since 100 BC), as metadata (since 100 AD), as a premise in a math 
problem (since 1645), as evidence (since 1648), as information about something 
(since 1630), as computer bits (since 1980), and as a diﬀerence (since 2000) (Furner, 
2016).  
The last of these was developed by Floridi (2008) as the 'diaphoric' definition 
of data, referring to a lack of uniformity in something at some level of abstraction. In 
brief, Floridi (2011) defines level of abstraction as a set of features of the world that are 
relevant to someone for some purpose. Thus in a system of traﬃc lights, some data 
could be the color (red vs. yellow vs. green); while in a system of wine, some data 
could be the tasting notes (fruity vs. herbaceous vs. spice vs. mineral). In Floridi's 
philosophy of information, data is the most primary concept. This is also consistent 
with both Furner's (2016) and Yu's (2015) analyses. On these accounts, identifying 
data requires enough interpretation to perceive of a diﬀerence but not enough to 
ascribe meaning. 
It should be noted that the notion of building up from data is at odds with 
perspectives which see human experience as, first, a holistic encounter with whole 
structures of meaning (e.g., those rooted in Dewey, 1934/2005, or Heidegger, 
1927/2010). From this point of view, some would argue that it does not seem 
possible to validly separate 'data' from the meaning and interpretation that gave rise 
to it, and thus the concept of data is of dubious relevance to information-behaviour 
(and related) accounts respecting lived experience. However, it may still be a useful 
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concept, not in terms of being a building block of real experience but as a concept 
analytically isolated and identified after the fact.  
 Information 
 There is significant contention around the concept of information in 
information studies, with some scholars preferring the concept of document to 
overcome conceptual limitations of information (Ørom, 2007), and others 
suggesting that information is unnecessary considering that information studies is 
truly concerned with human activities, unstructured data, measurements, conceptual 
schema or human valorisation, depending on the sub-discipline in question (Furner, 
2004). Still, many insist that the concept of information is necessary and there has 
been more discussion of information than of any of the other epistemic concepts 
surveyed here. All this furnishes deeper conceptual understanding to both those who 
adopt and those who reject operationalizing information as a concept. 
There are numerous definitions of information, which are surveyed by Bates 
(2010) in her encyclopaedia article on the topic and Furner (2010) in his review 
article on philosophy in information studies. Bates discerns seven categories of 
definitions for information that have emerged in academic discourse. These categories 
are communicatory, activity-based, propositional, structural, social, deconstructionist 
and multitype (Bates, 2010). Furner oﬀers a diﬀerent scheme, seeing three families of 
definition: semiotic (information as sign), sociocognitive (information as dialogue) 
and epistemic (information as evidence). Yu (2015) argues that the diversity of these 
definitions has arisen in part from a lack of methodological rigor in establishing 
them. Yu finds that three methodological approaches have been used to define 
information: those performing linguistic analysis, those using the origin of the 
universe as the point of departure, and those responding to practical constraints. 
The concept of information is sometimes criticized for engendering the 
conduit metaphor (Brown and Duguid, 2000; Day, 2000; Frohmann, 2004; 
Hjørland, 2000; Ørom, 2007). Discussed in detail by Day (2000), the conduit 
metaphor has influenced much of the development in information studies. According 
to Lakoﬀ and Johnson (1980), the conduit metaphor is based on a three-tiered 
cognitive metaphor: (1) ideas are objects; (2) linguistic expressions are containers; 
and (3) communication is sending. In Day's (2000) view, this metaphor was 
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introduced to information studies via Shannon's mathematical theory of 
communication, which explicitly conceptualized information transfer as a conduit-
based process and has since served as the basis for information studies and 
communication studies. With the conduit metaphor, information is understood to be 
quantifiable, factual, and intentional (Day, 2000). It ignores the possibility that, for 
example, a verbal message may include a meaning beyond the literal content of its 
words (Day, 2000), which is an outmoded notion, as is described below in the 
section on understanding. Though a conduit-conducive view of information may 
serve engineering purposes, it is problematic for information behaviour—for this 
reason, Furner (2010) is sceptical of attempts to construct a one-size-fits-all definition 
of information. In any case, a satisfactory account of information for information 
behaviour must account for the dialogic, contextualized nature of information. 
Therefore, when conceptualizing information for the purposes of applied 
epistemology, this question should be considered. Also as discussed above in the 
section on data, there still may be some usefulness in identifying discrete pieces of 
information, so long as the implications of doing so are considered.  
In general, information is taken to be an epistemic entity between data and 
knowledge (Bates, 2010; Furner, 2010; Yu, 2015). According to prevailing accounts, 
information is data which is bundled with meaning (Bates, 2006; Floridi, 2011; Yu, 
2015). Yu (2015) is careful to emphasize that the bundling of meaning always occurs 
in a specific context. A more detailed account of information is given in the 
philosophy of information by Floridi (2011), who defines information as diaphoric 
data that is well-formed (according to a relevant syntax), meaningful (according to 
relevant semantics) and true (correct within a relevant level of abstraction, or domain 
of applicability). Interestingly, Budd (2011), without reference to Floridi's work, 
proposes that a satisfactory account of information must hinge on meaning and 
truth, lending credence to Floridi's account. 
Additionally, two recent interpretations of information have emerged from 
discussions of the conduit metaphor and are worthy of reflection. Bosancic (2016) 
observes that most definitions of information conceptualize it as a static entity, either 
mental or physical, despite scholars such as Buckland (1991), who suggested that 
information can also be a process. As such, Bosancic proposes a renewed 
consideration of information as a flow, after philosopher Dretske's (1981) book 
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Knowledge and Information Flow. Bosancic oﬀers the visual metaphor of information 
'sap' circulating within a tree of knowledge growing from the data ground. Similarly, 
but independently, Tkach (2017) proposes a definition of information based on 
Heidegger's (2010) discussion of being-in-the-world, which asserts that being is 
inherently environmental. In Heidegger's philosophy, as in Tkach's definition of 
information, situation and situated are principally inseparable (Tkach, 2017). Thus 
information is 'the quality of [human being's] being informed in order to carry out its 
tasks and to select and use equipment appropriately in the fulfillment of those 
tasks' (Tkach, 2017, p. 38). In this sense, information is not an entity, but a 
spatiotemporal relationship among beings. Notably, Tkach does not invoke any other 
epistemic concepts in his discussion, whereas other authors suggest that multiple 
epistemic concepts form a hierarchy (Floridi, 2011; Rowley, 2007; Yu, 2015; Zins, 
2007). Thus, it seems that for Tkach there is no such hierarchy or multiplicity of 
epistemic concepts. 
In sum, though particulars diﬀer somewhat, contemporary accounts of 
information emphasize the contextual and processual features involved in the 
bundling of meaning with some perceived diﬀerence in the world (which may or may 
not be separately identified as data) to some end. A view of information that 
concords with the discussion of understanding that is discussed below is a 
constructionist account of information. That is, information can be picked out from 
the flow of existence and considered as content about something else if doing so will 
be useful in some way. Here Floridi (2011, p. 78) oﬀers a lucid description: 
Ultimately, information is the result of a teleological process of data modelling at a 
chosen [level of abstraction]; it does not have to represent or photograph or portray 
or photocopy, or map or show or uncover or monitor or... the intrinsic nature of 
the system analysed, no more than an igloo describes the intrinsic nature of snow 
or the Parthenon indicates the real properties of stones. From this perspective, the 
world is neither discovered nor invented, but designed by the epistemic agents 
experiencing it. This is neither a realist nor an anti-realist but a constructionist 
view of information. (ellipsis and emphasis his)  
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 Meaning 
 The concept of meaning forms part of Ackoﬀ's (1989) epistemic pyramid in 
being partially constitutive of information. Since Ackoﬀ, meaning has been invoked 
in many definitions of information, including those by Bates (2005, 2006), Floridi 
(2011) and Yu (2015), discussed above. Bates does not address the meaning of 
meaning, and Yu specifically brackets it out of his discussion. Floridi, however, does 
address meaning in some detail. Floridi considers a number of accounts of meaning 
in philosophy and notes that they have been limited by their focus on language (i.e., 
equating meaning to 'dictionary definition'). In general, primitive accounts of 
meaning assume direct correspondence between a symbol and its referent, the fallacy 
of which has been exposed by more modern accounts, most famously in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, first published in 1953 (Floridi, 2011). 
Another account was developed by philosopher-turned-information-scientist Wilson 
(1960), which will be discussed below in the section on understanding because 
Wilson explicitly ties his discussion to understanding.  
Floridi intends for his account of meaning to overcome these limitations 
through its basis in information, rather than language. Floridi views meaning as 
coordinating action toward goals. In this sense, the meaning of something is the way 
it aﬀords and constrains actions, and it is therefore inextricable from its context. This 
seems compatible with Gibson's (1979/1986) theory of aﬀordances and philosopher 
Mark Johnson's (2007) definition of meaning drawn from cognitive neuroscience 
(e.g., the work of Antonio Damasio) and the philosophical tradition of pragmatism 
(e.g., John Dewey). Notably, Johnson's account specifically allows for meaning to 
manifest as a diﬀerence in human experience (not necessarily outwardly observable 
action); as described by Johnson, meaning is the way in which patterns of neural 
activity and their relations 'evoke feeling-thinking responses in us' Johnson (2007, p. 
243). In this sense, meaning is also clearly implicit in Tkach's (2017) definition of 
information described above. Floridi's account of meaning also seems compatible 
with other accounts developed within information studies, such as that of Neuman 
(2006), who defines meaning as a system's response to a signal, and Thornley and 
Gibb (2009), who emphasize the processual and contextual contingency of meaning. 
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 Knowledge 
 As mentioned above, it has been assumed that the main purpose of 
information studies is to help people acquire knowledge (Egan and Shera, 1952; 
Fallis, 2006). As such, knowledge has been a much-discussed epistemic aim in 
information studies. Furner (2010) contends that information studies has no 
standard conception of knowledge, which is supported by Rowley's (2007) survey of 
introductory textbooks. Synthesizing the literature, Furner (2010) identifies two rival 
views: knowledge as true information (i.e., objective knowledge), and knowledge as 
individually internalized information (i.e., personal knowledge).  
Many scholars draw a link between information and knowledge, sometimes 
also including data (Floridi, 2011; Rowley, 2007; Zins, 2007). Bosancic (2016), for 
instance, conceptualizes information sap explicitly to connect data and knowledge. 
Floridi (2011) sees knowledge as multiple units of information that are embedded in 
a coherent explanatory network. In a similar move, Bates defines knowledge as 
'information given meaning and integrated with other contents of understanding' (Bates, 
2006, p. 1042). Yu's (2015) view of knowledge diﬀers here: Yu sees knowledge as a 
species of meaning (which, combined with data, forms information) that is derived 
from some socially acceptable knowledge-generating means (e.g., academic research). 
For Yu, knowledge is analytically isolated from its expression; knowledge (e.g., 
Newton's law of universal gravitation) can be expressed with diﬀerent data (e.g., as a 
technical formula vs. in children's picture books) and thus furnish diﬀerent 
information. 
Separate from discussions linking knowledge to other epistemic concepts, 
knowledge has been researched in itself, generally conceptualized in terms of its 
explicitness or implicitness (or tacitness) (Rowley, 2007). The concept of tacit 
knowledge originated with Polanyi (1958, 1966), who observed that people may do 
things in ways and for reasons that are unknown to them, and that what is unknown 
may not be articulable. In other words, 'we can know more than we can tell' (Polanyi, 
1966, p. 4), especially when it comes to creative acts. Particularly in the field of 
knowledge management, tacit knowledge has been heavily researched (Tsoukas, 
2011). However, both Day (2005) and Tsoukas (2011) argue that theoretical 
development regarding tacit knowledge has stalled because many researchers assume 
that tacit knowledge is in principle propositional but is simply latent in its symbolic 
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representation. On the contrary, Day and Tsoukas argue that (at least some) tacit 
knowledge is in principle ineﬀable and is inseparable from the skilled actions it 
underlies; Day builds his argument based on the expressionist philosophy of Deleuze, 
while Tsoukas references Polanyi's seminal works which themselves drew on the onto-
epistemology of Heidegger. Cook and Brown likewise find knowledge and action to 
be inextricable: 'knowing is the epistemological dimension of action' (Cook and Brown, 
1999, p. 387). This perspective is consistent with the tenet in practice theory that 
situated action is a way of knowing, which is becoming widely adopted in the study 
of information behaviour or practices (Lloyd, 2011; Olsson and Lloyd, 2016; 
Savolainen, 2008). 
These diﬀerent conceptualizations of knowledge—as pure meaning (Yu, 
2015), as a coherent web of information (Bates, 2005, 2006), as information that is 
accounted for in a network of questions and answers (Floridi, 2011), and as skilled 
action (Lloyd, 2011; Polanyi, 1958, 1966)—demonstrate that information studies 
takes a broader view of knowledge than does contemporary Anglophone 
epistemology (Rowley, 2007). Rowley (2007) finds that, in information studies, 
knowledge is also sometimes seen as a mix of epistemic content, capability, 
experience, skills and values. In epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is taken 
only as an intellectual good (as in Yu, 2015) and is generally defined as a belief that is 
both true and justified (Steup, 2016), pointing only to the conceptualization of 
knowledge as epistemic content; in information science, on the other hand, 
knowledge is sometimes seen as a mix of epistemic content, capability, experience, 
skills and values (Rowley, 2007).  
It is worth noting, however, that some epistemologists have identified other 
types of knowledge: For instance, Worth (2008) argues for narrative knowledge (what 
x is like), which is compatible with Bruner's (1986) argument that story is a mode of 
human reasoning, complementary to logic. Additionally, van Manen (2014) draws 
from hermeneutic phenomenology in proposing pathic knowledge, as emotional or 
primordial knowledge (as opposed to gnostic knowledge, which is cognitive or 
processual knowledge); this seems to be the same dimension of knowledge that 
pedagogical philosopher James Taylor (1998) calls poetic knowledge (a holistic, from-
the-inside experience of reality). It may be the case that narrative knowledge, pathic 
knowledge and poetic knowledge are diﬀerent names for the same thing: van Manen 
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(2014), for instance, asserts that narratives aﬀord pathic knowledge and that pathic 
knowledge refers to a holistic, from-the-inside experience of reality. Coterminous or 
not, these concepts point to a dimension of human knowing that has apparently been 
overlooked in contemporary Anglophone epistemology but which may nonetheless 
have a place in information science, as Rowley's (2007) analysis suggests.  
All this suggests some lack of clarity (and paradigmatic diﬀerences) regarding 
what knowledge is and what counts as knowledge. This seems to point to the 
importance of allowing what counts as knowledge to emerge in the particular context 
under study rather than have it be imposed a priori (which may result in overlooking 
or misapprehending knowledge). This becomes an important benefit of taking an 
understanding-based approach to studying information, which will be described 
below.  
 Understanding 
 Understanding was originally a dedicated level of Ackoﬀ 's (1989) epistemic 
pyramid, which Ackoﬀ described as dealing with causal relations. Though Ackoﬀ 's 
model in general has been much-discussed, the concept of understanding elicited 
virtually no comment in information studies. An exception is the work of Bellinger, 
Castro and Mills (2004), who suggest that understanding should not be its own level, 
but rather that understanding supports the transition from each stage to the next. 
This tension reflects two ways in which understanding has been explored in 
philosophy: as ontic understanding and as ontological understanding.  
The distinction of the ontic from the ontological comes from the work of 
Heidegger (2010). For Heidegger, ontic characteristics are those describing the 
particular manifestation of a being, while ontological characteristics are those 
describing its existence; ontics gives an account of beings, while ontology gives an 
account of being. For example, ontic characteristics of human beings include gender, 
hairstyle and eye colour; ontological characteristics of human being include being-
toward-death, mood and understanding (Heidegger, 1927/2010). These terms have 
not been used as diﬀerentiators in the philosophical discourse on understanding, but 
they provide a useful framework for organizing the literature.  
Ontically, understanding can refer to objectual understanding (understanding 
x), propositional understanding (that x) and interrogative understanding (how x), 
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though these categories are debated (Baumberger et al., 2017). Ontologically, 
understanding refers to the human capacity for understanding (Baumberger et al., 
2017). It seems that Ackoﬀ (1989) was describing ontic understanding, while 
Bellinger et al. (2004) were describing ontological understanding.  
It is ontological understanding that has historically seen the most attention in 
both philosophy and information science. Locke (1690/1995), for instance, plumbed 
this sort of understanding—the question of how the mind works—in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, which influenced Hume's (1748/2007) An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which forms the basis of our modern 
view of human cognition (Morris and Brown, 2017). Ontological understanding was 
also discussed by Dilthey (1883/1989) in his conceptualization of human science. 
For Dilthey, understanding refers to a process that employs all a person's capacities 
and is diﬀerent from pure intellectual knowing. This concept was developed further 
in hermeneutic phenomenology by Heidegger (2010), for whom understanding is a 
contextualized, perceptive and intentional mode of being-in-the-world that entails 
pursuing projects and engaging with possibility. For Heidegger, ontological 
understanding is the basis of ontic understanding. This conceptualization of 
understanding underlies contemporary hermeneutic phenomenology, whose 
propriety for information science has been espoused by many scholars, including 
John Budd, Rafael Capurro and Joacim Hansson (Kelly, 2016). Additionally, 
hermeneutics has been influential in human– computer interaction (Dourish, 2001; 
Winograd and Flores, 1986). In information science, the hermeneutic perspective 
seeks to provide an ontological–epistemological account of information processes by 
interrogating their foundations (Kelly, 2016). Though hermeneutics has long been a 
minority in information science, it seems to be gaining traction (Vamanu, 2013), as 
evidenced by, for instance, the Heideggerian model of information behaviour 
proposed by Tkach (2017). As a final note, ontological understanding seems to be 
the only sort of understanding considered by Floridi in the philosophy of 
information, and only in the observation that 'it seems that knowing requires 
understanding, or at least that the two are mutually related' (Floridi, 2012, p. 451). 
However, in light of contemporary discussions on understanding, it seems reasonable 
to ascribe the label of ontic understanding to the network of question-and-answer 
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accounting that makes a piece of information count as knowledge in Floridi's (2012) 
framework.  
Ontic understanding has seen comparatively less interest in philosophy over 
the past several centuries, but this may be a historical accident (Kvanvig, 2003). 
Moravscik (1979) argues that understanding was an important connotation of the 
Greek word episteme, but that word has generally been rendered in English only as 
knowledge. As such, Anglophone epistemologists have ignored ontic understanding 
until the late 20th century (Kvanvig, 2003).  
One area of philosophy in which ontic understanding has been explored for a 
longer period (throughout the 20th century) is in the philosophy of language 
(Baumberger et al., 2017). For example, Wilson (1960) presented a doctoral 
dissertation focusing on ontic understanding in linguistic communication. The main 
innovation of Wilson's approach was in recognizing all meaning as context-
dependent, contingent and action-based rather than 'stored' in words. This work was 
later articulated for utility in information retrieval as the concept of situational 
relevance (Wilson, 1973). Wilson's (1960, 1973) work was extended by O'Connor, 
Kearns, and Anderson (2008) in grounding a philosophy for information retrieval of 
non-text documents, but even this extension was limited by its basis in the 
philosophy of language. For instance, O'Connor et al. give the example of an Afghan 
song, saying that they would not be able to get 'more than a pittance' of meaning 
from it because of the language barrier (p. 18), whereas an Afghan would have 'all the 
relevant elements for him to extract meaning in the document' (p. 18). Here O'Connor 
et al. (2008) assume that the only meaning a song has is its linguistic meaning. This 
overlooks the reality that every day millions of people listen, dance and cry to music 
in a language they do not speak, even music with no words at all (Goodman, 1976; 
Jackson, 1998).  
More recently, ontic understanding has become a compelling subject in 
epistemology (Baumberger et al., 2017), with some epistemologists arguing that 
understanding is the rightful object of epistemology, rather than knowledge (Greco, 
2014; Grimm, 2012; Kvanvig, 2003, 2005). This is because ontic understanding is 
seen as epistemically more valuable than knowledge and because the traditional 
factors defining knowledge (truth, justification and belief ) are less problematic when 
considered as factors defining ontic understanding (Baumberger et al., 2017). 
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However, the precise nature of ontic understanding is hotly debated among 
epistemologists (just as is, for that matter, knowledge), as reviewed by Baumberger et 
al. (2017).  
Regarding the value of ontic understanding, both Kvanvig (2003) and 
Williamson (2000) argue that knowledge is less valuable than traditionally assumed, 
and Kvanvig proposes that ontic understanding is an epistemic aim of greater value. 
For Kvanvig, ontic understanding is uniquely valuable for two reasons. First, ontic 
understanding admits of degrees (shades of gradation, rather than the binary of 
known/unknown) (Kvanvig, 2003). Second, understanding is immune to epistemic 
luck (i.e., merely guessing correctly rather than reliably or justifiably knowing) 
because it involves a conscious sense-making eﬀort (Kvanvig, 2003). Stephen Grimm 
(2012) argues that this eﬀort is innately satisfying and goes beyond the mere 
acquisition of truth (as for knowledge). Grimm suggests that ontic understanding is 
valuable because it entails a structural model that mirrors the world, and when we 
have such a model we feel more deeply engaged with the world. In this way, 
according to Grimm, the concept of ontic understanding accommodates both 
subjective understanding (e.g., that one's Zodiac sign drives their fortunes) and 
objective understanding (e.g., that living on donuts alone can lead to health 
problems) (Grimm, 2012). Thus, even if an ontic understanding is not objectively 
true, it can be satisfying because of the innate human desire to make sense of the 
world (Kvanvig, 2011).  
In this sense, ontic understanding always involves a cognitive achievement, 
while the same cannot be said of getting knowledge (Pritchard, 2010, 2014). 
Zagzebski (2001) describes this achievement in terms of transparency, which also 
makes ontic understanding more valuable than knowledge: 'It may be possible to know 
without knowing one knows but it is impossible to understand without understanding one 
understands' (Zagzebski, 2001, p. 246). Philosophers of understanding generally refer 
to this achievement as grasping (Baumberger et al., 2017). Grasping involves being 
able to identify how the various elements described by a model are supposed to 
depend upon, and relate to, one another (Grimm, 2012; Pritchard, 2009; Kelp, 
2015). To qualify as ontic understanding, the result of this grasping should be a 
coherent set of relationships (Baumberger et al., 2017). One outcome of a person's 
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having ontically understood may be their ability to apply generalizations to specific 
cases (Grimm, 2012).  
Contemporary Anglophone epistemologists are generally concerned only 
with intellectual reasoning, and this has admittedly coloured their discussion of 
understanding (Grimm, 2012; Kvanvig, 2003). However, there have been some 
broader conceptualizations of understanding in epistemology. Catherine Elgin (2017) 
argues for a holistic view of (ontic) understanding:  
Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. Suppose our objective is to understand 
the wrongness of lying. This might mean a variety of things. We might want to 
understand why lying is wrong, or what makes lying wrong, or when or to 
what extent lying is wrong. These are all legitimate and important questions. But 
I am after bigger game. I want to understand how lying's being wrong is woven 
into the fabric of human life. Satisfactory answers to all of the foregoing questions 
will supply part of the answer but, I suggest, only part. (Elgin, 2017, p. 83, 
emphasis hers)  
Further, Elgin (2002) argues that epistemologists should consider pictorial art, as art 
often challenges assumptions and furthers inquiry in other fields. Elgin (2002) 
suggests that, while art may not always contribute to knowledge, it is epistemically 
valuable in that it contributes to ontic understanding. Briesen (2014) takes this 
further. Briesen posits that, as ontic understanding involves constructing mental 
models, pictorial art must be able to contribute to these models via chains of 
reference. To construct this account, Briesen draws from Goodman's (1976) 
philosophy of symbol systems. Goodman (1976) oﬀers a robust account of how 
artworks can be conceptualized as semantically and syntactically dense and replete 
systems which allow humans to trace chains of reference. Thus, as Elgin (2002) 
argues, artwork can facilitate understanding by triggering new perspectives.  
Except for the work of Bawden (Bawden, 2007; Bawden and Robinson, 
2016a, 2016b), these recent philosophical developments have gone unnoticed within 
information science. However, scholars have acknowledged the possibility of 
epistemic aims besides knowledge in information science (Fallis and Whitcomb, 
2009; Rowley, 2006, 2007), and they have recognized that oftentimes the underlying 
reason people seek information is not simply to acquire knowledge, but to attain 
something diﬀerent (e.g., understanding or wisdom) (Furner, 2010). Bawden and 
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Robinson (2016a) suggest that the concept of understanding may be particularly 
useful for information science, given that issues such as information overload have 
arisen in areas of wide information access and may be due to a lack of understanding 
and overcome by a cultivation thereof. The concept of ontic understanding helps 
account for inconsistencies and outdated information in collections, and so it seems 
to be a better match for the realities of the information professions (Bawden, 2007; 
Bawden and Robinson, 2016b).  
 Wisdom 
 Ackoﬀ (1989) originally conceptualized wisdom as evaluated understanding, 
specifically the ability to see the long-term consequences of a potential action. 
Rowley (2006) notes that, since Ackoﬀ proposed the hierarchy, there has been no 
discussion of wisdom in information studies, though scholars in information and 
knowledge management have been calling for explorations of wisdom. To that end, 
some research has been done; for instance, Warhurst and Black (2015) develop a 
seven-part definition of wisdom (knowledge, application of knowledge, judgment, 
breadth of perspective, accepting uncertainty, working through networks of 
understanding, and striving to live a good life) and use it to assess managerial 
wisdom. However, Teo-Dixon and Sayers (2011) caution against seeing wisdom as a 
well-defined, perfect goal that all managers should strive for, as doing so can close oﬀ 
the poetic and ethical possibilities of wisdom. 
Outside the realm of information, Gugerell and Riﬀert (2011) remark that 
wisdom has seen an upsurge of interest in the social sciences in recent decades. They 
seek to integrate some of the discourse from philosophy, psychology and education to 
establish an empirically-measurable definition of wisdom. From their analysis, 
Gugerell and Riﬀert propose a definition of wisdom that also recognizes a temporal 
component and moral system within which one can be considered wise. 
Unsurprisingly, wisdom has long been a topic of interest to philosophers 
(Ryan, 2014). As reviewed by Sharon Ryan (2014), philosophical accounts have 
ranged in seeing wisdom as epistemic humility (i.e., a person is wise only if they 
believe they are not), epistemic accuracy (i.e., a person is wise if their beliefs are 
justified), as a species of knowledge (i.e., a person is wise if they know many things, 
particularly how to live well), and as a hybrid of these. One recent hybrid approach 
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defines wisdom as a kind of 'deep rationality': a person is wise if they know a lot of 
valuable things, including about how to live rationally, if they are committed to living 
rationally, if they have few unjustified beliefs, and if they are sensitive to their 
limitations (Ryan, 2012). 
Understanding and Applied Epistemology in Information Studies 
Based on this review, a conceptual epistemic framework emerges for the 
consideration of understanding in information studies, which is illustrated in Figure 
1 and described in the following paragraphs. 
  
Figure 1: Framework of epistemic concepts 
This framework takes ontological understanding, a perceptive and situated 
engagement with the environment, to be the mode of being by which any intellectual 
activity is possible. It takes information to be the basis of knowledge and ontic 
understanding. Here information is defined as a perceived diﬀerence (i.e., diaphoric 
data) that is bundled with meaning (i.e., action in some sense); the data can be 
analytically isolated after the fact. Information can become knowledge once it is 
accounted for in a satisfactory way; this accounting-for places knowledge within a 
larger framework of ontic understanding. Ontic understanding is defined as a 
coherent and self-transparent network of knowledge constructed by a conscious 
agent. This is to say that implicit knowledge, insomuch as the knowing is inextricable 
from the doing, is perhaps better classed as a form of ontic understanding than of 
knowledge. Indeed, it seems likely that most of what has been discussed as knowledge 
is more appropriately seen in terms of understanding—that is, as the coordination of 
multiple 'pieces' of knowledge. In this framework, information and ontic 
understanding are developed over a background of ontological understanding. The 
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connection between understanding and wisdom remains unclear, but it seems that 
understanding can lead to wisdom after some time and by some means.  
The purpose of devising this framework was to clarify the relationship of 
understanding (as a relatively new concept) to other epistemological concepts in 
information science. This was necessary as preparatory work for future studies in 
'understanding-seeking' information behaviour, which has been suggested by Bawden 
and Robinson (2016a, 2016b) and discerned empirically by, for example, Cowan 
(2004), in a study of the information behaviour of visual artists.  
The discussion here is intended to be provocative rather than final: Might not 
it be the case that, after all, many people's information behaviour are directed toward 
ontic understanding but that our scholarly vernacular has simply lacked the 
knowledge–understanding distinction? Perhaps also the study of understanding will 
have the capacity to reveal forms of knowledge and ways of knowing—or at least of 
information—that previously went undetected. And to be sure, this framework will 
be subject to modification and further nuance. For an example of an outstanding 
question: Is it the case that understanding is composed of (only) knowledge, or could 
there be elements of understanding that do not qualify as knowledge?  
Though information studies has mostly focused on information and 
knowledge, the discussion above suggests that there is much to be gained by focusing 
on understanding in information studies: 
• Understanding has a sizable literature in philosophy, spanning hermeneutics, 
epistemology, philosophy of language and aesthetics, which can continue to 
be integrated and contribute to information studies. 
• Understanding as an epistemic aim is more valuable than knowledge 
(Kvanvig, 2003), not least because it coordinates multiple pieces of 
knowledge.  
• As understanding is constitutive of knowledge, studying understanding may 
be a way to uncover forms of knowledge and aspects of knowledge that go 
unnoticed in other approaches.  
• Understanding seems to be what happens when information is integrated, 
rather than merely knowledge. Thus studying understanding can be more 
naturalistic than studying 'getting knowledge'; and information studies has 
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been seeking more true-to-life approaches to information behaviour (Fidel, 
2012). 
• Understanding emphasizes situated, conscious agency, thus avoiding the 
conduit metaphor and foregrounding lived experience, another research 
frontier in information studies (Bruce, Davis, Hughes, Partridge and 
Stoodley, 2014).  
Conclusion: Directions for Information Studies 
The conceptual framework developed in this paper oﬀers not only synthesis but 
significant novelty to information studies. 
 First, it proposes the concepts of ontological and ontic understanding as a 
framework for bringing together separate discussions on understanding in 
information studies and philosophy. Historically, information studies has only 
recognized ontological understanding, in hermeneutics-based research (Kelly, 2016). 
More recently, information science scholars have begun to recognize understanding as 
an epistemic concept, as developed in contemporary Anglophone epistemology 
(Bawden and Robinson, 2016a). These two formulations of understanding have been 
seen as separate or even irreconcilable (Bawden, 2016; Bawden and Robinson, 
2016a). This paper suggests that ontic understanding is built upon ontological 
understanding. Thus, these two conceptualizations of understanding are not at odds 
with each other, but rather characterize diﬀerent aspects of human activity and 
together paint a fuller picture. This insight stems from Heidegger's (2010) 
conceptualization of understanding (i.e., that all understanding is at root self-
understanding), which is also compatible with Johnson's (2007) more recent 
aesthetic and pragmatic discussion of understanding rooted in modern neuroscience. 
This points to an opportunity to clarify the unity of these conceptualizations 
of understanding in concrete studies of how people build ontic understanding 
through engaging with documents, something first called for in information studies 
by Bawden (2012). This research may also find points of convergence or synthesis 
among other epistemic frameworks in information studies, such as Popper's 
(1972/1979) theory of the three worlds of knowledge—World 1 of material reality, 
World 2 of subjective experience and World 3 of recorded information. According to 
Brookes (1980), information studies focuses on the interaction between Worlds 2 
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and 3. And indeed, Popper (1979) describes this interface as World 2 grasping for an 
understanding of World 3. As Popper writes, 'the activity of understanding consists, 
essentially, in operating with third-world objects' (1979, p. 164). 
Further research in this vein could be seen as an application of 
epistemological theory (i.e., applied epistemology), but also as a way in which 
findings from information studies can contribute to theorization in other disciplines. 
It may be useful, for example, to delineate a taxonomy of ontic understandings—
such as distinguishing understanding matters of taste versus matters of fact. Similarly, 
is it possible to discern a framework of misunderstanding and other quasi-
understandings based on the concepts of mis- and disinformation (Fox, 1983)? 
Discussing these issues would certainly be useful for information professionals, who 
must deal with infelicitous epistemic states as a rule, and they may find interest in 
other academic disciplines as well.  
Applied research in understanding may also better demonstrate the broad role 
that documents (especially fictional literature, pictorial art, etc.) play in human life. 
This may foster an appreciation of documents for their own sake, demonstrating the 
fallacy of Fallis and Whitcomb's (2009, p. 177) assertion that 'things like exposure to 
documents are valuable only insofar as they lead to knowledge acquisition. We do not 
value for them their own sake' (emphasis theirs). Finally, because understanding is 
diﬀerent from knowledge, a better understanding of understanding may reveal ways 
of knowing that have not yet been acknowledged. 
 If we can gain insight into how people build understanding through engaging 
with documents, then information researchers and practitioners will be able to 
develop heuristics for creating information services and systems that support 
understanding rather than merely provide information. There are many areas of 
information studies that would warrant such application. Information literacy is but 
one example: McKenzie (2000) conceptualizes information literacy as a form of 
understanding, and she links the building of understanding to questioning: 'Without 
strong questioning skills, information technologies contribute little to understanding or 
insight. There is even some chance that they might dilute understanding and interfere with 
thinking' (McKenzie, 2000, p. 15). Further research on the relationship between 
understanding and questioning could contribute to the development of 
understanding-conducive technology. Likewise, these discussions could be integrated 
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with Lloyd's (2010) concept of information literacy landscapes. For Lloyd, 
knowledge is constructed in the dynamics between learner and environment. In the 
context of the discussion here, literacy could also be considered a form of 
understanding which incorporates multiple modalities of knowledge. Related to 
information literacy, Bawden and Robinson (2016a, 2016b) argue that issues of 
information abundance (such as information overload) may arise because of a lack of 
understanding (or the skills to cultivate it. Bawden and Robinson (2016b) and 
Langefors (1977) envision a future where information systems support 
understanding. Bawden (2012) suggests that these systems might include diverse 
modes of information synthesis, thematic analysis and visualization. The future for 
understanding seems bright.  
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